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Abstract
We analyze capital  flight  from Eastern  Europe in  the 1990s,  a problem that
although was as significant, and possibly as detrimental to economic growth, as its
1980s Latin American predecessor, has received scant attention in the literature so
far. Specifically, we employ five capital-flight measures used in earlier studies and
apply  a  “general  to  specific”  modeling  approach  in  a  panel  of  seventeen  E.
European  countries,  trying  to  uncover  the  main  determinants  of  the  problem.
Though  these  determinants  differ  across  the  estimated  models,  three  appear
consistently  significant:  real  exchange  rate  appreciation,  inflation  and  budget
deficits. Lastly, we discuss the implications of the empirical findings for the IMF-
sponsored economic stabilization programs.
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1. Introduction.
Capital flight became a serious problem for E. European countries in the 1990s.
Simply put, it deprived these countries, which were heavily dependent on external
financing in their tortuous path towards a market-based economy after decades of a
centrally-planned  one,  from financial  resources  that  were  badly needed  for  their
development.  Yet, despite its magnitude and severe consequences for the affected
countries, this problem has received scant attention so far. The existing literature has
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focused on Latin America (L.A.) –where capital flight in the late 1970s and early
1980s contributed to both the eruption and the severity of the “debt crisis”—and to a
lesser extent E. Asia (see, for example, Cuddington [1987], Dooley [1987], Gordon
and  Levine  [1989],  Kant  [1996],  Myrvin  and  Hallet  [1992],  Pastor  [1990],
Schineller [1997], Ul Haque and Khan [1985]), while the few studies that refer to E.
Europe focus on Russia (Loukine [1998], Sicular [1998], Wintrobe [1998]).
E. European countries share some of the pathologies of L.A. in the 1970s and
1980s.  Prominent  among  them  are  domestic  distortions,  economic  and  political
alike, that not only discourage capital inflows from developed countries to finance
investment, but additionally encourage outflows. These distortions often arise from
binding  policy  constraints,  the  products  of  inelastic  government  expenses  and
limited revenue sources, which cannot be eased without considerable social cost. In
addition, limited access to the international financial markets hinders the ability of
these countries to smooth shocks, such as, a deterioration in the terms of trade or an
increase  in  the  world  interest  rates,  and  leads  to  a  more  volatile  economic
environment.  The  latter  not  only  is  conducive  to  capital  outflows,  but  may
additionally  lead  to  a  vicious  cycle  of  deteriorating  access  to  the  international
financial markets, more economic volatility and more outflows.
Nevertheless,  E.  European countries  are  sufficiently  different  from L.A.  ones
and, at the same time, share enough common characteristics among themselves to
justify  this  study.  To begin  with,  these  countries,  former  COMECON members,
have  similar  economic  structure  –despite  that  they  followed  different  paths  to
economic transformation, and face similar economic and social problems. Among
the  latter,  they  are  dependent  on  external  financing,  characterized  by  relative
technological backwardness, and plagued by crime and corruption. They also aspire,
with the exception of Russia, to join the European Union. 
Further  justifying  this  study,  the  magnitude  of  the  problem  is  considerable.
Depending on the measure used (see below for details), capital flight for the years
1994-1998 ranged on the average between 1% and 6% of GDP. For comparison, the
corresponding figures for Western Europe were well below 1% of GDP, and could
be readily accounted for by short-term investment flows.  In addition, the external
environment was very different in the 1990s from that in the preceding two decades,
with  globalization,  financial  liberalization  and  market-friendly  reforms  becoming
the norm as opposed to the more state-interventionist practices of the past.
Owing to the difficulty of estimating capital flight, a difficulty well recognized in
the literature (see, among others,  IMF [2000] and Myrvin and Hallet [1992]) and
also amply illustrated by the proliferation of measures proposed in earlier studies,
we  employ five  of these  measures.  They are chosen  with  two  criteria:  quarterly
availability and consistency. In addition, we apply a “general to specific” modeling
approach, pooling data for all  E. European countries for which the relevant  time
series exist.
Our empirical findings have some strong policy implications. To begin with, for
all five capital-flight measures employed, real appreciation appears to have been a
significant  determinant,  suggesting  that  outright  devaluation  of  an  over-valued
currency  might  be  more  appropriate  than  gradual  depreciation.  Inflation  was
significant for four measures,  indicating that the inflation tax, which some of the
sample countries have resorted to trying to finance their budget deficit, may have
backfired in the form of capital flight. The deficit, itself, was significant for three
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measures,  providing  some  support  to  IMF’s  recommendation  of  balancing  the
budget.
The importance of the above findings is further highlighted by some potential
explanatory variables that were not significant. To begin with, the insignificance of
dummies for capital controls indicates that IMF’s recommendation for elimination
of  all  such  controls  requires  further  justification.  Also,  the  insignificance  of  the
difference between the domestic and international nominal interest rates, in contrast
to  what  several  previous  studies  have  found  (Mikkelsen  [1991],  Gibson  and
Tsakalotos [1993], Pastor [1990], Dooley [1987]), suggests that, to the extent this
difference reflects  expected currency depreciation (Bansal  and Dahlquist  [2000]),
the  growing  liberalization  and  integration  of  financial  markets  in  the  1990s  has
rendered deviations from interest rate parity inconsequential and thus affected the
nature and determinants of capital flight.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the five
measures of capital flight  employed,  along with  some statistics that  highlight  the
magnitude of the problem. Section 3 discusses the potential explanatory variables
and analyzes the empirical results, while Section 4 concludes. 
2.  Capital Flight Measures.
In the estimation of capital flight, a task that would border the impossible even
without the inherent difficulty of properly counting legal cross-border flows,1 two
approaches  have  been  followed.  The  first  distinguishes  capital  flows  between
“regular”,  i.e., for trade, investment and portfolio diversification,  and “irregular”,
i.e.,  all  other  flows;  and  assigns  capital  flight  to  the  second.  In  the  words  of
Kindleberger,  capital  flight  is  “money  that  runs  away”  (Kant  [1996,  p.  2]).  The
second approach is more inclusive and categorizes as capital flight all outflows. The
rationale is that all outflows deprive the countries in question –in which the growth
potential and hence the expected returns are higher than in industrial countries—
from resources needed to finance domestic investment –the vehicle for growth– and
current account deficits (Tornell and Velasco [1992]).
In this study, we employ five of the measures used in the literature, the criteria
for their selection being quarterly availability and consistency. The first three derive
from the first approach, while the remaining two from the second. These measures
are described below.
• Hot Money I,  shorthand notation HM-I. It is equal to  errors & omissions (line
78cad in the International Financial Statistics – IFS) plus non-bank short-term
private  capital  outflows (line  78brd  which  corresponds  to  the  sub-category
Other Sectors of  Other Investment Assets). The name derives from the often-
used characterization of short-term capital  flows,  which  are very volatile,  as
“hot money”.
• Hot Money II, HM-II. As above, with  net non-bank short-term private capital
flows (IFS lines 78brd and 78bvd. Line 78bvd corresponds to the sub-category
1
 For related discussions, see, among many, Dooley (1987), Eggerstedt et al. (1993), Gordon and Levine
(1989) and Myrvin and Hallet (1992). See also IMF (2000).
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Other Sectors of Other Investment Liabilities). Comparing these two measures,
the  first  uses  the  (change  in  the)  asset  side  of  the  private  non-bank  sector
balance  sheet,  while  the  second  –recognizing  that  the  private  sector  holds
simultaneously both foreign assets and liabilities—uses (the change of) its net
position.
• Errors & Omissions, E &O. The justification is that this IFS account includes
capital flight in addition to actual errors and omissions.
• World  Bank  –  Residual  Method, W.B..  It  measures  capital  flight  as  the
difference between the “sources” and the “uses” of funds. As sources of funds
are regarded changes in the net external position of the official sector (IFS lines
78bpd and 78btd), plus net FDI flows (IFS lines 78bdd and 78bed), plus net
equity  flows  (IFS  lines  78bkd  and  78bmd).  The  uses  of  funds  include  the
financing of the  current  account  (IFS line 78ald) plus  the  change  in foreign
exchange reserves (IFS line 79dad).
• Claessens-Naudé, C-N. It is a variation of the previous measure, named after the
researchers who proposed it  (Claessens and Naudé [1993]),  that  uses the net
external position of the country (from the joint BIS-OECD-IMF-WB statistics
on external debt) instead of that of the official sector.
Giving some reassurance about the empirical results, the five measures, despite
their different conceptual foundations, exhibit the same trends over time. Figures 1
and 2,  which  exhibit  capital  flight  in millions  of U.S.  dollars from Lettonia  and
Russia for the period 1993:Q1 to 1999:Q2, are characteristic of this feature. In them,
a positive number indicates outflows, while a negative one indicates inflows.
Figures 1 and 2 also reveal two important things. First, the characteristics of each
country seemingly affect  capital flight.  Briefly,  all  measures tend to decline over
time for Lettonia, but increase for Russia. Second, the third measure, Net Errors &
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Omissions exhibits low correlation with the other four. This is consistent with the
fact that this measure has the weakest foundations and has also performed poorly in
previous empirical studies (Eggerstedt et al. [1993]).
Figure 3 indicates that the magnitude of the problem is significant. Depending on
the measure employed, capital flight ranges between 1% and 6% of GDP on the
average, for the period 1994-the first full year in the sample to 1998-the last full
year. The highest estimates are given by the  HM-I,  HM-II and  C-N measures. For
comparison, the corresponding figures for Western Europe were well below 1% of
GDP, and could be readily accounted for by short-term investment flows.
3.  Modeling Capital Flight.
We  begin  with  a  brief  discussion  of  the  variables  that  have  been  found
significant  determinants  of  capital  flight  in  earlier  studies  (see,  for  example,
Cuddington [1987],  Dooley [1987], Gibson and Tsakalotos [1993],  Kant [1996]).
We  also  justify  theoretically  their  inclusion  using  the  extended  version  of  the
interest  rate  parity (IRP)  presented  in  equation  (1)  below.  To  the  best  of  our
knowledge, it is the first time such a rigorous justification is offered in the literature.
it ≈ it,$ + ( Etet+1 – et )/et + (RP + LP) + TC                              (1)
In it, it stands for the country’s nominal interest rate, it,$ for the world interest rate
(proxied here with the appropriate US$ rate), et the nominal exchange rate in units of
domestic currency per unit of foreign currency (here the US$),  Etet+1 the expected
nominal exchange rate in the same units,  RP and LP the risk and liquidity premia,
and TC the transaction costs incurred when investing in the country relative to the
transaction costs of investing abroad. RP and LP are grouped together because it is
next to impossible to disentangle them. Also, ( Etet+1 – et )/et expresses the expected
nominal  depreciation;  if  it  is  positive,  the  country’s  currency  is  expected  to
depreciate, and vice-versa.
35
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Figure 3.
Capital Flight From E. Europe [% of GDP]
Note: From left to right, HM-I, HM-II, E&O, W.B and C-N measures of capital flight.
European Research Studies, Volume VI, Issue (1-2), 2003
The  IRP  essentially  says  that  investors,  domestic  and  foreign  alike,  will  be
indifferent between investments in the country and abroad as long as the difference
in the respective interest rates is equal to the expected currency depreciation plus the
required by them risk and liquidity premia, plus some compensation for the relative
transaction costs in the country and abroad. 
Alternatively, in case 
it < it,$ + ( Etet+1 – et )/et + (RP + LP) + TC  (2)
the return from investing  in  the  country,  it,  will  not  be adequate,  investment
abroad will be more profitable, and capital flight will occur. 
Conversely, in case 
it > it,$ + ( Etet+1 – et )/et + (RP + LP) + TC                 (3)
domestic investments will be more profitable and an inflow will occur. 
Starting  from equilibrium,  when  IRP  holds—equation (1),  an  increase  in  the
expected  depreciation,  or  in  the  risk  and  liquidity  premia,  or  in  the  relative
transaction costs will make the inequality (2) hold and thus lead to capital flight. The
increase in the relative transaction costs can happen through an increase in the cost
of  investing  in  the  country,  a  decrease  in  the  cost  of  investing  abroad,  or  a
combination thereof.  As for an increase in the domestic  interest  rate,  it,  it  is  not
certain  whether  it  will  lead to  capital  flight  or  capital  inflow (inequality  (3)).  It
depends, as elaborated below, on whether this increase is autonomous or it  takes
place in an effort to stem capital flight.
The potential explanatory variables for capital flight follow.
• Inflation, symbol INFL. Rising inflation provides the incentive to the residents
of a country to reduce their holdings in domestic currency. Part of their holdings
will be directed to domestic real assets, while another part will find its way to
real and financial investments abroad, through legal or illegal channels. In terms
of the IRP, rising inflation may indicate poor economic performance and lead to
higher risk premium—inequality (2) holds.  INFL is measured as the percent
change of the consumer price index (line 64 in the IFS) from the same period a
year ago and is expected to have positive sign.
• Nominal interest rate, i. The sign of this variable is not certain. A rising interest
rate may compensate domestic residents for the high inflation (term RP in IRP)
and the possibility of depreciation (term ( Etet+1 – et )/et ), as well as for the risk
of holding domestic currency (term RP), leading, as a result, to lower outflows
or even inflows in case inequality (3) holds–negative sign. On the other hand,
the nominal interest rate may be rising in an effort by the authorities to stem
outflows, in which case this variable may be positively correlated with capital
flight—inequality (2) holds (positive sign). The nominal interest rate used is the
domestic deposit rate and comes from publications of the central banks of the
sample countries.
• Difference  between  the  domestic  and  international  nominal  interest  rate,
adjusted for exchange rate changes, IDIF = it – it,$ - ( Etet+1 – et )/et. Everything
else equal, a rise in IDIF will make investments in the country more profitable
and thus lead to lower outflows, and vice-versa. Hence, this variable is expected
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to have a negative sign. The foreign interest rate used is the U.S. Treasury bill
rate (IFS line 60c), while the nominal exchange rate in units of the country’s
currency per US dollar is the average rate (line rf). Owing to the difficulty of
predicting nominal exchange rates, Etet+1 is proxied with the realized exchange
rate  et+1. Lastly,  a variation of this variable tested but found insignificant was
the actual  difference between the domestic and international nominal  interest
rates, it – it,$.
• The size of the external sector,  MXGDP, measured as the sum of exports and
imports  (source:  IMF’s  Direction of  Trade Statistics)  as  percentage  of GDP
(line 99b). (GDP, which is reported at annual intervals, is divided by 4 to get a
quarterly  estimate.).  A  bigger  external  sector  is  associated  with  more
transactions with foreigners and, hence, with more opportunities to circumvent
foreign exchange restrictions plus more funds to deposit in international banks
abroad. These opportunities essentially translate to lower transaction costs for
domestic  residents  investing  abroad  and,  hence,  higher  relative  costs  for
investing domestically—higher TC. This variable is expected to have a positive
sign. 
• Government balance as percent of GDP,  GDEF. A falling balance (line 80 in
IFS), which corresponds to a rising deficit, may lead to difficulties in financing
it and force the government to raise taxes directly or indirectly, the latter often
through an inflation tax. In both cases, a falling balance may be associated with
higher risk premium—inequality (2) holds. This variable is expected to have a
negative sign. 
• Changes in the real exchange rate, in percent, DREER. Since a negative DREER
denotes  –by  construction—  real  appreciation,  which  renders  the  country’s
goods less competitive and creates pressures for a nominal  depreciation and,
more generally, for a change in the policy mix. Thus, real appreciation may be
associated with higher risk premium, suggesting a negative expected sign for
this variable. The real exchange rate comes from the IFS (line reu).   
• Foreign direct investment (IFS line 78bed) as percent of GDP, FDI. The sign of
this variable is not certain à priori. A rise in FDI may essentially finance capital
flight, by providing foreign exchange to those who want it (positive sign). On
the other hand,  it  may reflect foreign investors’ increasing confidence in the
prospects  of  the  country  which,  if  shared  by  domestic  residents,  will  be
associated with smaller capital flight (negative sign). In terms of the IRP, in the
first  case  we  have  lower  transaction  costs  for  domestic  residents  investing
abroad (higher TC); in the second, lower risk premium.
• Number of capital controls,  CCONTR. Though capital controls are thought to
help a country reduce capital flight, the sign of this variable is not certain. On
the one hand, capital controls may –perhaps for a limited time—be successful in
stemming outflows by increasing domestic residents’ cost of investing abroad—
lower  relative  cost  of  investing  domestically  (lower  TC);  which  implies  a
37
European Research Studies, Volume VI, Issue (1-2), 2003
negative sign. On the other hand, the imposition of (more) controls may signal a
deteriorating external financing situation, raise the prospect of devaluation and,
hence,  induce through higher  risk and liquidity premia  domestic  residents  to
intensify their  efforts  to get their  money out of the country;  which implies a
positive  sign.  Conversely,  a  reduction  of  controls  may  signal  an  improving
situation and, hence, reduce the incentive for outflows (negative sign as well).
The  number  of  capital  controls  has  been  estimated  from  the  IMF’s  annual
publication  Exchange  Arrangements  and Exchange  Restrictions.  Though this
number cannot account for the effectiveness and degree of enforcement of the
controls, it is a good proxy that has been used in other studies as well (Bartolini
and Drazen [1997]).
• Dummies  for  the  exchange  rate  regime:  DPEG for  a  pegged  exchange  rate
regime,  DMANAG for  managed  floating,  DFLEX for  limited  flexibility,  and
DFREE for free floating. These dummies are constructed with information from
the aforementioned IMF publication, as well as from the central banks of the
sample  countries.  Their  sign  is  not  known  a  priori.  For  example,  a  fixed
exchange rate regime, DPEG=1, if it is credible, may reduce outflows (negative
sign). If it is not, it may increase outflows (positive sign) as domestic residents
will try to convert their money to foreign currency before the collapse of the
regime. In terms of the IRP, the significance of this variable may arise from the
differing  expectations  of  foreign  and  domestic  investors  regarding  the
sustainability  of  the  exchange  rate  policy.  Foreign  investors’  expectations
regarding devaluation, which are captured by the term  ( Etet+1 – et )/et, may  be
regarded  as  too  optimistic  –as  often  is  the  case—by  the  better  informed
domestic investors.
The equation to-be-estimated follows. In it, the subscript  j denotes the country,
while the +, - and +/- signs above each variable denote its expected sign.
       +    +/-   -           +            -             -         +/-       +/-            +/-           +/-           +/-          +/-
CFj = φ( INFL, i, IDIF, MXGDP, GDEF, DREER, FDI, CCONTR, DPEG, DMANAG, DFLEX, DFREE )
The  sample  is  largely  determined  by  data  availability.  It  includes  seventeen
countries,  Albania,  Armenia,  Belarus,  Bulgaria,  the  Czech  Republic,  Croatia,
Estonia,  Hungary,  Lettonia,  Lithuania,  Moldova,  Poland,  Romania,  Russia,
Slovakia,  Slovenia and Ukraine.  Georgia is  not included for the reason it  started
publishing balance of payments  data consistent with the IMF guidelines in 1999.
Further,  Azerbaijan’s  data  had  many  missing  observations,  while  owing  to  war
Yugoslavia’s  and  Bosnia’s  data  are  unreliable.  The  sample  also  extends  from
1993:Q1,  when  the  three  Baltic  republics,  plus  Croatia,  the  Czech  Republic,
Slovenia and Slovakia started publishing quarterly data, to 1999:Q2, the last quarter
for which data were available. Indicative of the challenges posed by the fragmented
data is that Albania started reporting quarterly data in 1995 and Belarus in 1996.
The modeling approach is “general to specific”,  starting with four lags of all
explanatory variables and dropping the insignificant ones with a series of F-test for
joint  significance,  with  pooled  time-series  cross-sectional  data.  The  four  lags,
besides allowing  for the delayed  effects  of the potential  determinants  of capital
flight, allow for the lags in the collection and reporting of economics statistics. For
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the sample countries, as well as for all countries that do not have sophisticated data
collection systems, these lags are considerable. 
The  estimated  equation  also  included  country  dummies  to  capture  country-
specific  effects,  such  as,  the  political  situation and the  stage  of  reforms.  These
dummies are not likely to be collinear with the exchange rate dummies because the
exchange rate regime of the sample countries changed during the sample period.
Further,  the  estimation  was  done  with  a  heteroskedasticity-consistent
variance/covariance matrix, using the ROBUSTERRORS option in RATS.
Table 1 summarizes the empirical results. Staring from the left, the fist column
reports the determinants that were significant for at least one capital flight measure,
while  the  remaining  five  columns  report  the  estimated  coefficients  and  their  t-
statistics (in parentheses) – one column for each measure.
 TABLE 1.
The Determinants of Capital Flight
        +    +/-   -           +            -             -         +/-       +/-            +/-           +/-           +/-          +/-
CFj = φ(INFL, i, IDIF, MXGDP, GDEF, DREER, FDI, CCONTR, DPEG, DMANAG, DFLEX, DFREE )
Explanatory
Variables
Capital Flight Measure
HM-I HM-II E&O W.B. C-N
INFLt-4 0,0002634(3,157)*
0,000834
(1,917)***
0,0002834
(1,65)***
0,000556
(3,51)*
MXGDPt 0,0525(2,426)*
MXGDPt-2 0,0532(2,033)**
GDEFt -0,000421(-4,39)*
-0,000379
(-2,47)*
GDEFt-4
-0,00
0399
(-2,686)*
it-1 -0,0365(-2,164)**
it-3 -0,0233
      (-2,0013)**
DREERt -0,1373(-2,83)*
-0,1185
(-2,293)*
-0,1322
(-2,0275)**
-0,2177
(-3,566)*
-0,18
2
(-3,52)*
IDIFt 0,04687(3,463)*
IDIFt-4 -0,0128(-2,4953)*
DPEGt -0,03688(-2,547)*
R2 0,564 0,451 0,186 0,417 0,264
D.W. 2,04 1,64 2,19 1,93 2,09
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Notes:
1. Variable definitions: see main text.
2. Sample: 1993:4 – 1999:2.
3. t-statistics in parentheses, below the estimate coefficients.
4. One, two and three asterisks (*) denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
5. The estimation was done with a 
• “general to specific” modeling approach, starting with four lags of the
independent variables and eliminating all the insignificant ones with a series of
F-tests for joint significance.
• heteroskedasticity-consistent variance/covariance matrix, using the
ROBUSTERRORS option in RATS.
As Table 1 indicates, the change in the real exchange rate, DREER, is significant
at high confidence levels (5% for the  Errors & Omissions measure and 1% for all
others) and has the expected sign. The next most important determinant of capital
flight  is  lagged  inflation,  INFLt-4,  which  also  has  the  expected  sign.  INFLt-4 is
significant at the 1% level for HM-I and W.B., and at the 10% level for HM-II and
E&O.  The third  most  important  determinant  is government  deficit  (as percent  of
GDP) which is significant at the 1% level for HM-I, HM-II and C-N (fourth lag). 
Other less important determinants are the size of the external sector,  MXGDP,
the  nominal  interest  rate,  i, and  the  difference  between  the  domestic  and
international nominal interest rate adjusted for exchange rate changes, IDIF, each of
which is significant at the 5% or higher level for two capital flight measures. Lastly,
the dummy for a pegged exchange rate system, DPEG, is significant at the 1% level
for the W.B. measure only.
In  general,  however,  the  dummies  for  the  exchange  rate  regime  are  not
significant. Nor are the variables for FDI and the number of capital controls.
It  is  worth  noting  that  the  two  significant  determinants  whose  sign  was  not
certain á priori, the nominal interest rate, i, and the dummy for a pegged exchange
rate system, DPEG, have negative sign. This means that a rising interest rate helped
stemmed capital flight,  while  the second indicates  that  the pegged exchange rate
system was credible. In addition, the equation for the  E&O capital-flight measure
has  the  lowest  R2,  consistent  with  the  fact  that  this  measure  has  the  weakest
foundations of all.
As  noted  in  the  introduction,  the  above  results  have  important  policy
implications. Briefly, they indicate that real appreciation should be avoided. Hence,
for countries with higher inflation than their major trading partners a fixed exchange
rate regime may not be appropriate and, perhaps, a once-and-for-all depreciation of
an overvalued currency might be preferable than gradual depreciation. In addition,
inflation and government deficits should be reigned at.
The empirical results also highlight some of the acute dilemmas policy-makers in
the sample countries were facing. Specifically, allowing for a rapid enough nominal
depreciation  of  the  currency,  in  an  effort  to  avoid  real  appreciation,  might  fuel
inflation and thus backfire. This severity of this dilemma is further highlighted by
the fact that many countries anchor their stabilization programs on the exchange rate
(exchange-rate based stabilization; for references and details, see Calvo and Végh
[1994]).
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And these dilemmas are more acute than one might be led to believe based on
the existing literature. Briefly, all the variables that were significant determinants of
capital flight in previous studies are significant here as well—with the exception of
the difference between the domestic and the international nominal interest rates (see,
also, the discussion in the introduction) and the number of capital controls. There is
a caveat though, which, on the positive side, further underscores the results of this
paper: The significance of these variables varies across the measure of capital flight
used. Only the real exchange rate appreciation is consistently significant for all five
measures used; and inflation for four of them.
4.  Concluding Remarks.
  
Studies like this one are hampered by severe data limitations, a fact that may
explain  why  capital  flight  from  E.  Europe  has  received  scant  attention  in  the
literature  so  far.  Nevertheless,  the  high  level  of  statistical  significance  of  the
estimated coefficients, their consistency across the estimated models as well as with
expectations,  together  with  the  fact  that  the  five  capital  flight  measures  exhibit
similar trends despite their different conceptual foundations, are reassuring about the
robustness of the conclusions. An implication of these conclusions is that the path to
development and prosperity of E. European countries, along which they must fully
utilize all their resources, real and financial alike, will be difficult and fraught with
many policy dilemmas. 
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 TABLE 1.
The Determinants of Capital Flight
        +    +/-   -           +            -             -         +/-       +/-            +/-           +/-           +/-          +/-
CFj = φ(INFL, i, IDIF, MXGDP, GDEF, DREER, FDI, CCONTR, DPEG, DMANAG, DFLEX, DFREE )
Explanatory
Variables
Capital Flight Measure
HM-I HM-II E&O W.B. C-N
INFLt-4 0,0002634(3,157)*
0,000834
(1,917)***
0,0002834
(1,65)***
0,000556
(3,51)*
MXGDPt 0,0525(2,426)*
MXGDPt-2 0,0532(2,033)**
GDEFt -0,000421(-4,39)*
-0,000379
(-2,47)*
GDEFt-4
-0,00039
9
(-2,686)*
it-1 -0,0365(-2,164)**
it-3
-0,0233
(-2,0013)*
*
DREERt
-0,1373
(-2,83)*
-0,1185
(-2,293)*
-0,1322
(-2,0275)*
*
-0,2177
(-3,566)*
-0,182
(-3,52)*
IDIFt
0,04687
(3,463)*
IDIFt-4
-0,0128
(-2,4953)*
DPEGt -0,03688(-2,547)*
R2 0,564 0,451 0,186 0,417 0,264
D.W. 2,04 1,64 2,19 1,93 2,09
Notes:
6. Variable definitions: see main text.
7. Sample: 1993:4 – 1999:2.
8. t-statistics in parentheses, below the estimate coefficients.
9. One, two and three asterisks (*) denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
10. The estimation was done with a 
• “general to specific” modeling approach, starting with four lags of the independent
variables and eliminating all the insignificant ones with a series of F-tests for joint
significance.
• heteroskedasticity-consistent variance/covariance matrix, using the
ROBUSTERRORS option in RATS.
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Figure 3.
Capital Flight From E. Europe [% of GDP]
Note: From left to right, HM-I, HM-II, E&O, W.B and C-N measures of capital flight.
